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FOOD AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS; THE ROLE OF
AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL
, COMMERCE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Until that now famous series of Russian grain sales
. i

took place in 1972 agricultural policy in the United States
had begun to lose its sex appeal!

It had its challenges in

the drought and depression years of the '30s, and again
during World War II, but in both those cases the concern
.j

was whether we could produce enough for our needs.

In the

earlier of those decades, we had an additional preoccupation
with the economic survival of our farming communities.

Farm

families had to.be strong in every sense of the word to live
through the '30s.
In the '50s and early '60s, we experienced a nelv problem
one of recurrent surpluses.

Those "ever normal granaries"

of the FOR era became ever normally full and overflowing two
decades later.
pr~duced

Farm incomes plummeted, not because farmers

too little, but because they produced too much!

The

situation did have its bright spots though, at least to some
people; "cheap food" became a way of life in the U.S.

Our

consumers experienced the pleasure of having more and more
money left in their pocketbooks after doing their weekly
grocery shopping.

This occurred not simply because their

husbands (and the working wives too!) brought home a bigger

- 2 pay check, but also because a smaller percentage of that pay
check went for food.

By the early '70s, the percentage had

dropped below 16, even though people were eating out more
than ever before.

American families contentedly went about

spending more money for other things.
Consumers in importing countries benefitted from the
surpluses' (most of which were held in the U. S. and Canada)
too.

We and other exporters discovered that it cost money

to store surpluses, and that one could afford to move them
on the world market even if it meant shaving prices in some
manner.

This led, for example, to "food aid" programs in

which a nation would either give away its surpluses, or sell
them through the use of long term credit ,vi th exceptionally
low interest rates.

With food aid programs (P.L. 480 for the

U.S.), exporters could reduce their surpluses and feel like
humanitarians at the same time!
The exporting nations soon learned, however, that their
surpluses were too large to be fully absorbed by food aid,
i.e., we couldn't even give all that grain away in the
!

developing world.

This then led to use of the export subsidy,

still one of the most invidious of all trade practices.

One

can compete on any market if one's Federal treasury is lar<]e
enough!

These subsidies proved to be costly indeed (though

perhaps less costly than storage), but they moved a lot of
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food to importing nations at bargain basement prices.

U.S •

consumers were happy because food costs remained low, and
taxpayer costs, though high, were tolerated because we seemed
to be making progress in reducing the surpluses.

Exports

increased dramatically; not just because of subsidies, but
because of a growth in "lOrldwide demand for food products
and an ever widening competitive advantage for the American
farmer.
Then in 1972 the Soviet Union triggered a never to be
forgotten series of events by entering the world food market
in a massive ,yay.

Food prices in the U. S. skyrocketed, or

at least consumers thought they did!

Though the percentage

of income expended for food never did rise beyond a mean of
18, even that 2 percent jump seemed devastating to house.wives accustomed to paying the same amount at the checkout
. counter every week of the year!

. Con'sumer advocate groups

looked for villains in the picture, and almost everyone in
the production and marketing process was castigated before
the issue

quieted down.

U.S. agricultural exports skyrocketed too, and this led
to a strengthening of the dollar and a vast improvement in
both our balance and terms of trade (helped, admittedly, by
the dollar devaluations of this .,period).

Consumers benefitted

significantly from this, but few recognized those benefits.
They, in fact, argued vehemently for the imposition of export

·... ": .
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controls, and the government complied, though only on a few
occasions and for very short periods of time.

The use of

export controls shattered our image as a dependable supplier
of food, and we will pay dearly for that in years to come.
American farmers entered a period of unprecedented
prosperity.

Farm incomes leaped, and the implement dealers,

auto salesmen, and travel agents of small town America had
the finest derivative income years of their lives too.

Rural

America, which had been in the economic doldrums, was revitalized as never before.

Farmers, however, quickly capi-

talized their increased incomes into land, and farm real
estate prices soared.

Though this made net worth statements

a lot more impp"ssive than previously, it also reduced our
agricultural co:': .·..,titive advantage on the world scene -- a
troublesome orne:.'. r the future.
)

·In 1973 and

hunger, and the

:, everyone became ..an expert on world
~ devoted hundreds of radio and TV hours

T'

and thousands of

.int lines to this topic.

Malthusians had

field day.

They hawked their doomsday

philosophy on aJ.,,)st a full time basis.
. I

The 20th Century

Amidst all the

rhetoric, the mc:.:.c relevant response came from farmers around
the world!

They

~'..,acted

production, a bas:
forgotten in the

to the excellent prices by expanding

·.'!conomic principle which had nearly been
.~husian

shuffle!

As a result, we are

.'

,--'~"-',

.
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now back to more comfortable carryover levels, a propitious
time for objectively examining agricultural trade policy in
the U. S', and elsewhere,
Let us turn first to the developing countries, to whom
this issue is often a matter of life or death.
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Production Disincentives
Trade policy has both its production and marketing aspects.
In de'leloping countries, the former is often more important
than the latter.

Unfortunately, in attempting to follow the

cheap food policies of the developed world, too many developing
countries have actually discouraged agricultural production.
This may be politically wise in the short run, but in the long
run it is a devastating mistake.

This became painfully evident

to food importing LDCs in the post-1972 period, when their
terms of trade deteriorated dramatically.
Of even greater

signi~icance

is that industrial produc-

tivity in any nation simply cannot advance, and levels of
living cannot improve, until manpower can be released from
its agricultural sector.

This calls for enormous increases

in agricultural efficiency, an unlikely result when govern·j

:

ment is providing production disincentives!
Import Restrictions
Some developing countries have gone to the other extreme
in production policy by opting to protect their domestic agricultural producers through the use of import restrictions (often

-
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as an accompaniment to high support levels).

In many in-

stances the economic objective is a laudable one, in that
it provides a production stimulus.

Unfortunately, it is

not a policy that is likely to lead to efficient production.
Increased self sufficiency is an understandable goal, particularly for countries that·are experiencing balance of payments problems.

(Brazil is the classic example today, but

the same argument can be made for all LDCs who are suffering
through the present energy crisis.)

'One must be concerned,

however, lest import restrictions

taken for legitimate

reasons -- be retained when those reasons no longer apply.
This has often occurred, to the chagrin of the offending
nation's trading partners, and to the economic disadvantage
of the world as a whole.

Such violations of the spirit, if

no·t ,the rules, of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(the GATT) call for a more careful and continual appraisal
of such practices under the GATT, and for timely termination
thereof.
The import regimes of some developing countries have
been so protective that their domestic industries have become complacent, lethargic, and inefficient.

This has re-

duced (or eliminated) their international competitiveness,
thereby worsening the natic's terms of trade -- the exact
opposite of what was inten
. •'

governments of a number of

To their great credit, the
.2s (Argentina and Colombia,

e.g.) have recently recognized this incongruity, and have

- 7 had the political courage to do something about it by opening
their borders to increased competition.

Such action inevitably

incurs the enmity of the protected domestic industries, but
the government may actually have done them a great favor.

An

economically trouBled firm or industry cannot survive indefinitely on the domestic scene, let alone in fierce international competition.

If the firm or industry is forced to

meet import competition head

on~

(the assumption being that

the import competition is fair), it may modernize, alter its
management structure, and take other steps that will be in
.

;

its own long term interest.
Export Subsidies
A frequent rationale for LDC protectionism, and for the
use of export subsidies, is that of developing infant industries.
The idea, of course, is that in the absence of such assistance,
LDC industries will never be able· to' achieve the economies
of scale essential to compete with their developed country
brethern.
point!

., •. j

I am prepared to accept that argument -- up to a

Developing countries deserve a chance to improve their

competitiveness, but there comes a time when an "infant industry"

. i

,
is no longer an infant!

If the governmental protections

and incentives are successful, the industry "grows up" and
at that point it no longer merits special priv:L1eges in
,
·1;

.

.

.

,

international trade •
Some LDCs have suggested. in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva, that GATT rules should permit them to
subsidize exports with impunity.

That is simply an

-
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economically (and politically) unacceptable proposal.

It has

also been suggested that "safeguard" actions by developed
countries should exempt all imports from LDCs.

That too is

an unacceptable suggestion, for the same reasons.

Assisting

the LDCs, their industries and firms to be competitive is
one thing; to ask their DC competitors to battle them on a
permanently disadvantageous basis is quite another thing!
Preferences
Agricultural produc·l:s are a major export item, often the
major export item, for many developing countries.

Others have

the resource base to become exporters if and when they get
their economies on track.

Thus, it is understandable that

the LDCs delineate enhanced access to DC markets as one of
their principal objectives in the economic sphere.

Though

that objective extends to both agricultural and industrial
goods,the former offer the

greatest.i~mediate

potential for

many LDCs.
The United States and most other developed countries
have granted temporary tariff preferences to many developing
countries on hundreds of items.

The U.S. system, for example,

encompasses about 2,800 items involving nearly $3 billi.on of
LDC imports.

(Most, however, are industrial items.)

More

importantly, we import nearly $25 billion worth of these
same goods from our fellow developed countries.

Duty free

- 9 treatment for LDCs should afford them an opportunity to capture
a sizeable segment of that market •
.

,

"Speciial and Differential" Treatment
One disadvantage of preference systems, from the developing country viewpoint, is that they are temporary.

The U.S.

system has a 10 year life, but it includes provisions for
the earlier removal of countries and products from its benefits under certain circumstances.

In other words, the system

is by no means comparable to permanent benefits that can be
provided LDCs in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations.

For

this reason, many LDCs see the MTN as the forum with the most
potential for enhancing their market opportunities in the
developed world.
In the Tokyo Declaration of 1973, which launched the
current, seventh post-war MTN, the DCs agreed to provide
"special and differential treatment" for their LDC counterparts as the negotiations unfolded.

A great deal of effort

has been expended since then in attempting to delimit areas
where special and differential treatment -- which by definition constitutes a departure from the most-favored-nation
principle -- would be appropriate and desirable.

The United

States has expressed a willingness to consider such treatment

,.
•

in most of the MTN negotiating groups, and we have outlined
our ideas on the subject in a number of papers that have been

- 10 -
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submitted in Geneva.

I am optimistic that LDCs will gain

.j

significant market opportunities for their agricultural
products before the MTN concludes.
Commodity Agreements
Nearly all developing countries have a constant concern
with their balance of payments situation.

With limited foreign

exchange reserves, they are extremely vulnerable to price
fluctuations in both export and import goods.

Raw materials

prices have traditionally fluctuated,. sometimes violently,
on world markets.

In agriculture, this is often due to

supply being a function of unpredictable weather conditions.
With virtually all LDCs being either food importers or exporters, they continually suffer through the foreign exchange
impact of erratic commodity prices.

What is the answer?

There are many, but the one typically given by developing
countries is an international corrmodity agreement with
buffer stocks.
One cannot summarily reject the commodity agreement
answer for it has a lot of political appeal, at least at
present.

Nor should one reject it on economic grounds,

for a commodity agreement may be able to inject a certain

!,

degree of stability in the world market of a given product.

!

With a strong commitment by exporters to honor price ceilings, an equally strong commitment by importers to honor
price floors, price bands that are ,,,ide enough to permit

•

- 11 the market to work most of the time, provisions for new
suppliers to enter the market, a large enough buffer stock
to be influential when the margins are reached, and no readily
available substitutes, a commodity agreement has a fair chance
for success.

,

:
· j

Rarely, however, are all exporter and importer

nations willing to accept the cost, the discipline, and the
commitment that are essential to make such an agreement work.
Therefore, without even considering the philosophical aspects
of international commodity agreements, one must conclude that
the practical realities of economic life are such as to doom
most such agreements to failure.

In fact, a careful cost-

benefit analysis will preclude most of them from even being
initiated!
Many LDCs, however, view commodity agreements as a
mechanism for raising the price of raw materials they export.
In other words, they see some budding OPECs in the offing.
But this is unrealistic; it is most unlikely that any commodicy agreement that would achieve this purpose can be
successfully negotiated.
to assume:

For this to occur, one would have

(1) that importer participants in such an agree-

ment will be inept negotiators, or (2) that developed country

,,
.j
i

agreements as a new foreign aid mechanism.

J,

seem to be a reasonable assumption.

importers will deliberately accede to the use of commodit,'

·i

· -j

·i

I,

Neither would

Furthermore, if a

commodity agreement were "successful" in raising prices,

'!

,
;
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that succ ess woul d like ly be shor t lived .

1

coun tries are the prim ary impo rters of many comm
oditi es,

- i
." .i

Sinc e deve lopin g

they woul d be the ones to suff er most from the
pric e rise .
It woul d be ratio nal to assum e they woul d obje
ct (thou gh one
must wond er abou t this assum ption in ligh t of
the comp liant
acce ptan ce of OPEC ). Beyo nd that , howe ver, comm
odity pric e
incre ases will unqu estio nabl y stim ulate the deve
lopm ent and
use of subs titut es. This alon e will make most
, if not all,
pric e enha ncin g comm odity agree ment s viab le for
only a shor t
perio d of time .
The obje ctive

sh~red by deve loped and deve lopin g

coun tries alik e -- of affo rdin g LDCs a grea ter
oppo rtun ity
to expa nd expo rts,a nd hope fully a more attra ctiv
e net income ·for thos e expo rts, is a vali d one.
It is also high ly
desi rabl e in hum anita rian term s, and for main tenan
ce of
peac e in the worl d.

But sure ly there are bett er ways to do

. this than throu gh the use of inte rnat iona l comm
odity agre emen ts.

-

(at leas t as they have trad ition ally been desig
ned) !
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Prod uctio n Ince ntive s
As I indic ated earl ier, one of the para doxe s of
agri -

.i.

,
,,

.,

- - - _..
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- 13 the cost is enormous and the resultant surpluses can be sold
internationally only through the use of export subsidies (to
say nothing of the import restrictions that are necessary to
.

;

keep the system functioning).

In other words, many developed

countries deliberately maintain an agricultural production
plant that is uncompetitive internationally!
allegedly at least; for social reaSons.

They do this,

The argument made

is that their respective countries are better off by keeping
a substantial segment of the populatton in rural areas, rather
than to have them migrate to the cities.

(Though some migra-

tion is occurring nonetheless, the rate is quite low.)
It is not my intent to challenge the social policy of
these developed nations.

Nor is it my prerogative to do

SO)

they have a sovereign right to choose whatever social policy
they wish.

I have traveled many of

thos~

countries, and I

too'appreciate the beauty of their countrysitles and the
quaintness of their small farms

inefficient as they may be!

BU± as an economist I do object

and I believe other nations

have a right to object -- to the distortions that those social
policies cause in the arena of international trade!
Unfortunately, from an economist's viewpoint, many
.

,

developed nations have chosen to implement their rural social
policies through the use of high support levels on agricultural products.

This is probably the most trade dis-

tortive (and perhaps the least cost effective) policy that
they could possibly have chosen.

Both the European Community

- 14 and Japan have found, for example, that to provide reasonable
incomes for their small agricultural producers, support levels
must be set far above world market prices.
Export Subsidies
The upshot of- this" is that most everyone is unhappy!
Surpluses generated by high support levels must be sold on the
world market through the use of export subsidies.

This is not

likely to score points with more efficient farmers in the U.S.,
"j

Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and other exporting
nations \vho find their own exports undercut by the subsidies.
Trade policy experts call this the "third country" subsidy
problem.

It is an issue for which the present GATT rules are

totally inadequate.

(Because of this, the U.S. no", has

authority to deal with such unfair trade practices under
domestic law /Sec. 301 of the Trade Act of 19747, and about
a dozen complaints have already been'filed.)
Export subsidies can, of course, also be used to penetr~te

markets that would ordinarily be served by domestic

producers.

The European Community, for example, has long

subsidized its cheese exports to the U.S.

This not only

undercuts exports by Australia and New Zealand (the third
country subsidy problem), but it also takes part of the

U.S. market away from American dairy farmers.

The proper

response to such subsidies is the application of counter-

- 15 vailing duties (i.e., a duty equal to the subsidy, which
effectively neutralizes it), but subsidizing exporters
contend that countervailing is inappropriate unless "injury"
is shown.

(I would counter this contention by asserting that

injury is inherent in the use of direct export subsidies.
After all, the purpose of such a subsidy is to penetrate a
market that would not otherwise be penetrable.)
If export subsidies undercut world market prices, importers benefit from this unanticipated developed count.ry
generosity.

So long as they are not attempting to develop

their own production of the product in question, the price
cutting is a foreign exchange bonanza for them.

Nevertheless,

they are concerned about the long run implications of subsidy
practices.
If developed countries use export subsidies to rid themselves of agricultural surpluses, they can use such subsidies
to rid themselves of other surpluses too.

Some of these will

inevitably undercut exports from the developing world.
peting with the treasuries of the

deve~oped

Com-

countries is not

an enticing thought for LDCs with balance of payments problems.
But perhaps their major concern is that developed countries
typically use subsidies on products in which they are no
longer competitive.

These are labor intensive products, both

agricultural and industrial, where developLc" countries now

1 - - - - - - - - - - - -'"-----------: ...------"--.-...
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- 16 have either an absolute or comparative advantage.
---:
;

The con-

tention of the LDCs, and a legitimate one, is that developed
countries should be phasing out these industries, or at a
minimum should be phasing out their uncompetitive firms.

By

no means should they be expanding production of such goods
through the use of subsidies at a time when the LDCs are
trying to find a meaningful niche in the international trading
world.
Within subsidizing developed countries, economic joy is
hardly universal either.

Producers are obviously pleased

by the support from their governments, particularly when it
is. partially hidden in higher domestic food costs and thus
is not readily identifiable as a government subsidy!

But

taxpayers are not at all pleased by the costs they can see
(storage and export subsidies, e.g.), and they are uneasy
about those they cannot see (the indirect impact of higher
support levels on food costs).

U.S. taxpayers, for example,

objected vigorously to the million dollars per day we spent
to-store our grain surpluses a few years ago, and also to
,

the export subsidies we used prior to and including the in i-

,

tial Soviet grain sales.

The consumers of Western Europe, with

food prices far higher than ours,

mu~t

wonder about the

wisdom of subsidizing beef sales to the Soviet Unic

·~en

beef is not exactly a bargain in the supermarkets ot jrussels,
Bonn, or Paris!
There must be a better way to avoid and/or deal with
agricultural surpluses.
Quantitative Restrictions

- 17 to the rational conduct of international trade.

Whereas

subsidies are the principal distortion on the export side,

,

QRs fill a similar distortive role on the import side.

No

. I

matter how competitive one may be, it is mighty difficult
to penetrate a market walled in by a quantitative restriction!
The variable levy, which increases as the world market price
of a product falls, is no less onerous than the traditional
QR.

voluntary restraint agreements, none of which are

truly "voluntary," are an improvement 'in degree, but not in
kind.

For purposes of this discussion all can be considered

as quan'titative restrictions.
As described earlier, developing countries have been
able to rationalize at least some of their QRs under the
GATT rules, usually on balance of payments grounds.

Developed

countries, on the other hand (including the United States),
have struggled futilely to justify their quantitative restrictions, most of which are agricultural.

Some which might

have been appropriate when initiated (under safeguard rules,
. !

,

i

e.g.) are no longer defensible and should have been eliminated

,

years ago.

.1

. I

1,

Others are palpably illegal, and are being re-

tained in circumvention of the GATT.

If a solution to this

problem ca,n be found, world agricultural trade will be
immensely improved.

This is one of the priority objectives

of the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations.

- 18 Standards
Standards should be trade neutral, and both buyer and
seller should benefit from their use.
the case.

,

But that is not always

Japan, for example, some months ago rejected a

shipment of U.S. citrus because the fruit had been sprayed
with a particular chemical.

Yet that chemical had been ap-

proved for use by Codex Alimentarius, an international standards making body!

Of which Japan is a member!

This exemp-

lifies why we need to negotiate a procedural standards code
in the MTN.
Administrative Guidance
There are times "Then non-tariff barriers are extremely
difficult to discover and characterize.

A number of such

barriers, applicable to both agricultural and non-agricultural
goods, can loosely be described under the heading "Administrative Guidance."
category.

Customs procedures' frequently fall into t'his

Clearances are often inordinately delayed, and if

the imported product is perishable, it may never reach the
'ultimate consumer.
Or the word is quietly passed from a government official
to the private sector that import levels of a given product
are becoming worrisome.

The following month orders from

those private firms begin to decline.

This can be just as

effective as a quota, though it may never appear in the form
of a law or regulation!
Other Distortions
I have concentrated my attention in this paper only on

- 19 those practices which I consider to be the most distortive
•
to world agricultural trade. Many others could be mentioned,
particularly in the non-tariff barrier area, for nations have
become innovative in protecting their domestic industries
'

..,

from competition.
I have not even mentioned tariffs.

Though they can be

disruptive too, and though we need to further reduce tariffs
in the MTN, competitive firms and industries can overcome
many of the tariff levels that exist in the world today.

Non-

tariff measures, on the other hand, can often stop a competitive firm or industry in its tracks!
Yes, it is an imperfect world!

And the imperfections in

agricultural trade are some of the most imaginative of all.
But let us not be pessimists.,

Notwithstanding those imper-

fections, our own agricultural exports have nearly quadrupled
in the past decade.

N"ot a bad record, even though a fe;,

rocks have been thrown in our p'ath.
consumers around the

~lOrld

Beyond that, there are

who are picking up those rocks as

fast as producers are throwing them.

These consumers want

"

"i

a better diet, and if that calls for importing agricultural
products, they want to import!
Where does that leave us, in early 1977 as we move into
the

" '11

3es of the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations,

•

- 20 and as we debate renewal of our own farm legislation?

I

offer the following views for your consideration.
First, we must maintain our international competitiveness,
so that we can deal from equity and from strength at the
negotiating table.

This calls for concerted action in many

areas: agricultural research and extension programs; the
development of nel" agricultural technology; stimuli for
capital investment in agriculture; sound monetary and fiscal
policies generally; and farm legislation that will not
jeopardize the competitiveness that already exists.

Govern-

ment policies can help to maintain and enhance the efficiency
of U.S. agriculture.

Unfortunately, our big bureaucracy

sometimes harms, while trying to help.

I hope we can avoid

that outcome in the future!
Second, if we are competitive, we ought not apologize
for it, and we ought to use it to our advantage.

This is

not to suggest that we use food as a "weapon," the favorite
term of the media these days.

But .it is a recognition of

leverage, and the opportunity to use it for the benefit of
U.S. farmers and for our nation as a whole.

If we are not

careful, we can give away that leverage in a variety of ways.
Let's not do so!

11

II The negotiation of an international grain reserve is
an example of this. A grain reserve is like an insurance
policy, the cost ~f which should be borne by the policy holder.
In this case, that means that grain importing nations should
bear most of the cost, not the exporting nations as has been
true in the past!
It also means· that we should not unilaterallj'
create a "domestic grain reserve." Were we to do so, we would
sacrifice all our leverage in this arell, and the rest of the
world would quickly lose interest in an international reserve.

....,-,-,-,~-,----,-·i~.::.:..~:..:..:.~L :.~,.;...:..::~:"".,,;,;:,:.~··
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- 21 Third, we should proudly defend our basic agricultural
policies.

With an agricultural production and marketing

plant that is the envy of the world, we ought to try to convince others to move in our policy direction, rather than
vice versa.

Of course, conditions are different, and we

cannot expect the rest of the world to do everything our way.
In many cases, it would be inappropriate to do so.

But neither

is it appropriate to categorically reject our market oriented,
free enterprise system.
other nations well,
now have.

Many elements of our system can serve

perhaps more effectively than what they

Futures markets, for el{ample, have scarcely been

used in many agricultural trading nations.
Fourth, we should unhesitatingly challenge the trade
distortive actions of other nations, particularly those in
the developed world.
standard for trade

It does not make sense to have a double

pol~cy

the developed nations.

(agricultu:t;al or industrial) among

Though the energy crisis has had a

greater impact on some than on others, most economies of the
developed world are basically healthy.

And to the extent

they have economic woes, trade distortions are not the proper
means for responding to those woes.

We have authority to

deal with unfair trade practices (1) under the GATT, and (2)
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
cise that authority when the occasion
economic saber rattling!

He should exer-

demands.

This is not

It is simply the insistence that

international trade be carri! out in a fair, sensible, and
rational way.

- 22 For many years we failed to respond in such situations.
This led other nations to believe that they could use subsidies, dumping actions, import restrictions, etc. without
experiencing anything more than a protest from Uncle Sam.
And when the U.S. did respond (as we have recently) to such
indefensible practices, we were painted as the villain, as
"protectionist."

It is time that that perception be corrected

once and for all!
Fifth, we should encourage all trading nations to be
open, candid, and hopefully reasonable and rational in the
de'velopment of their trade policies.

This suggests that

nations follow some basic public policy principles:' (1)
notifying the GATT of trac:ie actions contemplated or taken,
a courtesy that is often not extended;

(2) consulting

~lith

nations that might be affected before" rather than after,
actions are taken;

(3) using open, public procedures in the

decisionmaking process so that anyone with interest -- nations,
fiEms, individuals -- may have an input; and (4) keeping any
restrictions temporary and no more onerous than absolutely
necessary.

If these principles were routinely followed, in-

ternational trade in agricultural products would be a whole
lot more rational than it is today.
Sixth, if our agricultural policies are right, we should
strongly enunciate them at the negotiating table.

Other

nations often expect the U.S. to compromise, or to "give up
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something."

It is up to us to make a negotiating round or a

conference a "success."

We are often chided for being too

"theological" on trade issues, meaning we are unwilling to
accept the other nation's position!
sound, let's not abandon it.

But if the principle is

It just may be that once in a

while the rest of the world is out of step, and we are in
step!

If we are confident that such is the case, we ought

to have the political courage to say so and stick with it!
Seventh, we must make progress un reducing agricultural
trade barriers in the multilateral trade negotiations.

With

,

tariffs, subsidies, import quotas, export quotas, variable
levies, voluntary restraint agreements, and other restrictions
still proliferating, this is hardly the time to agree to
disagree and corne horne.

Previous rounds of negotiations,

including the Kennedy Round a decade ago, have made considerable progress on the industrial side"little in agriculture.
This time we should stay in Geneva until we hammer out a
set of agreements that will advance the cause of world trade
in both sectors.

This will not only benefit U.S. farmers,

but consumers around the world as well.

In addition, it

provides an ideal opportunity for many nations to change
agricultural policies that they know are outmoded.
Perhaps the two major agricultural issues that must be
dealt with in the Tokyo Round are (1) export subsidies, and
, (2) quantitative restrictions, i.e., variable levies and

- 24 quotas.

Unless progress can be made in these two key areas,

particularly among the developed nations, the Tokyo Round will
be construed by the U.S. agricultural community (and by agricultural and other trade policy officials of many other nations

-

as well) as being no more successful than the Kennedy Round.
This, in turn, Ivill lead to strong demands for unilateral
action against the trade distortive practices of others.
Better that we all agree in Geneva (1) not to impose new
programs in these areas, and (2)

to place bound constraints

on existing programs, ,,,ith a further agreement that they be
phased out over an agreed adjustment period.
Eighth, we should encourage importing nations to take
steps to provide for their own food security, rather than to
depend on the surpluses of exporters for that security.' Some
of those steps are appropriate for the public sector, others
for the private sector-, and some eouid readily involve both.
They involve such actions as:

constructing additional storage

fo~ both raw and processed food products; buying or leasing

storage in the U.S. and other exporting nations; the use of
futures markets in the U.S. or elsewhere: and long term
contractual commitments.

1/

1/ It is somewhat ironic that the Soviet Union, a nonmarket economy nation, has done a much better job of protecting
itself again.st the instability of price fluctuations than have
the market economy nations of the Nestern world. The soviets
are alreadY aggressively pursuing most elcements of the course
that I have just outlined.

--.-~-.------.---
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- 25 Ninth, we must provide for an expansion of international
trade with the developing nations of the world.

In many

cases, this means enhancing their agricultural exports.

At

times, those exports will penetrate the U.S. market, in competition with our own producers.

At other times, they will

penetrate third country markets, in competition with our
exporters.

Nevertheless, we should accommodate this need

in a reasonable and meaningful way.
and tokenism is not enough.
aid, we have to mean it!

Rhetoric is not enough,

When we say we prefer trade to

If these nations are to become an

integral part of the world economy we cannot reduce foreign
aid, for the many reasons that are traditionally espoused,
and then stymie "special and differential treatment" in the
trade area too.

That would be a hypocritical result, for

which we would be duly and properly chastized in world public
opinion.
Finally, He should sell aggressively in world markets.
Even if trade barriers are reduced or eliminated, we cannot
expect buyers to come pounding on our door.

There is much

to be done in enhancing our reputation for producing a
quality product, honoring our cont'ractual obligations, being
a dependable seller, and servicing the needs of our customers.
In addition, there are a multitude of markets to be opened,
both geographically and for new products.

Observe, for ex-

ample, the many ways in which soybean products are being used

-~----------------,----

-

in the Far East.
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Hany of the more recent developments are

attributable to work by our soybean industry.

Observe, in

contrast, the few tasty, corn fed T-bone steaks that are
available, even in t.'.",e best restaurants and hotels, throughout the world!

Sirr..

of other products.

': comparisons could be made with lots
\·;0

I

ve just begun to truly market

u. S.

agricultural products.
CONCLUSION
There.are lots of "ifs" in the future of international
trade in agriculture.

Ifs in domestic agricultural policies,

•

ifs in the evolution of consumer movements, ifs on the political front, ifs in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations.

But the stakes are too high for us not to forge ahead.

One can always find reasons not to move toward freer
agricultural trade.

And it is even easier to rationalize

moves toward greater protectionism.

But neither the u.S.

nor any other major producer can afford to go that route.

-

Food is too important to the physical and economic wellbeing of the world, and it will become even more so as time
passes.

Furthermore, trade restrictions are too onerous,

and the GATT rules for agricultural commerce are simply
inadequate.

This is not the time to be hesitant and in-

decisive, let us not back away from the challenges!

,

,
.'

,

- 27 Apocryphally, a management expert once advised his client
not to view his difficulties as "problems" or "obstacles," but
rather as "challenges" and "opportunities;" to which the
harassed manager responded:

"Well, then I've sure got a lot

of insurmountable opportunities!"
I believe we -can handle our agricultural
trade challenges,
.
simply because the rewards for doing so are enormous -- a
better quality of life for producers and consumers alike,
worldwide.

Surely this is not an "insurmountable opportunity."

